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IDENTIFYING FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE 
THE USE OF DARK WEB CRYPTOMARKETS: 








Dark Web cryptomarkets represent a phenomenon in modern criminality and their study is of 
key importance to contemporary criminology. This study aims to identify factors that 
influence the use of cryptomarkets and to gain further insight into the opinions and 
experiences of their users. The aims of the study were achieved by identifying multiple 
cryptomarket users through snowball sampling and conducting a series of semi structured 
interviews. Users described quality, anonymity and harm reduction as major influencing 
factors of their cryptomarket use. Participants displayed the qualities of a rational consumer 
orientation and explained that their use of cryptomarkets was linked to social experience. 
Technological skill was identified as not being a barrier to the access and use of 
cryptomarkets for users as the majority of users in the study were instructed by a 
cryptomarket mentor. The conclusion of the research identifies that the modernisation and 
mirroring of legitimate website by cryptomarkets has an effect on the perceived legitimacy of 
the sites for the user and in turn acts as an influencer of their use. It is predicted the rapid 
expansion of cryptomarket populations in the near future, and that cryptomarkets pose a 
major challenge to UK drug policy.   
 
Keywords: Cryptomarket, Dark Web, Crypto-legitimisation, Cryptomarket Mentoring, 
Online drug use. 
 
Introduction 
Most people have some understanding of the scale of the internet, but only through the 
prism of what academics refer to as the surface web. The surface web refers to any web 
pages that have been indexed by search engines. Conversely, it is estimated that over 96% 
of the internet is not accessible through the use of these search engines and therefore never 
seen by the vast majority of users (Epstein 2014). This unindexed content is often referred to 
as the Deep Web (Bergman, 2001). The Deep web is made up of extremely diversified 
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content, including; content that is only accessible through private networks such as 
corporate and academic databases; private messaging boards and forums; websites locked 
behind a paywall and non-publically accessible private social media content. A small portion, 
or subset, of the Deep web is known to some as the Darknet or Dark Web. The Dark Web is 
content that is only accessible through anonymising software that hides the IP of the users 
(Barratt & Aldridge, 2016). Software such as The Onion Router, or TOR, have the ability to 
hide a user’s identity online and provide instantaneous anonymous communication with 
relative ease of use (Dingledine, Mathewson & Syverson, 2004). The Dark Web has 
provided key locations for numerous criminal and deviant activities, such as; terrorist forums; 
illicit pornography (Children, violence and animals); assassination services; finance fraud 
services; live stream murder forums; hacking services; the sale of narcotics and weaponry 
all hidden behind the cloak of anonymity (Moore & Rid, 2016). 
 
There are several different terms used by academics to define the anonymous sale of drugs 
on the Dark Web: Darknet marketplaces, Dark Net Market and Cryptomarket (Martin, 2014). 
The phrase “cryptomarket” was first coined by users on hacking forums and has been used 
by many scholars to describe these anonymous markets (Martin, 2014). Barratt and Aldridge 
(2016, pg.1) stated:  
“We define a Crypotmarket as a marketplace that hosts multiple sellers or ‘vendors’, 
provides participants with anonymity via its location on the hidden web and use of 
cryptocurrencies for payment, and aggregates and displays customer feedback 
ratings and comments”.  
 
Rather than simply being the transition of a crime into cyberspace, a cryptomarket is an 
extremely complex computer assisted system whereby an individual trying to sell drugs can 
act as a “vendor” on a host site, not dissimilar to that of legitimate sites such as Amazon and 
eBay (Barratt, 2012).  
 
This study was primarily derived from the conclusion of Barratt and Aldridge’s (2016) study: 
“Everything you always wanted to know about drug cryptomarkets* (*but were afraid to ask)”. 
Barratt and Aldridge stated that the studying cryptomarkets is of critical importance to 
criminologists and that there are multiple research questions that need to be asked in order 
to greater understand the depth, scale and uptake of use of Dark web cryptomarkets. This 
research aimed to address a number of questions following their work: What is the 
progression that leads individuals to become involved in cryptomarkets? How easy is it to 
become a cryptomarket user? Are the influencing themes of quality and anonymity universal 
to cryptomarket users? What are the processes that cryptomarket users deploy in order to 
achieve the maximum potential of their use? Are there factors that have been overlooked or 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2018) 
86 
 
over-attributed to influence the use of cryptomarkets? Are there factors of influence that 
have been missed by previous studies? What are the opinions of cryptomarket users as to 
UK drug policy and the future of cryptomarkets? 
 
A series of semi-structured interviews with active cryptomarket users were conducted. This 
qualitative method provided the dynamic ability to change the course of the study dependant 
on new data that became available during the process of data gathering (Birks & Mills, 
2015). Many studies that have researched cryptomarkets have primarily used secondary 
data of forum conversations on both cryptomarkets and legitimate sites (Barratt & Aldridge, 
2016). Face to face qualitative interviews allow a researcher to gain a detailed insight into 
the interviewee’s point of view and the interviews structure can often lead to new information 
or a differing perspective being revealed that had previously not been considered (Bryman, 
2015). Instead of using a rigid interview schedule, a series of themes taken from the 
literature were used to forge questions during the interview but there would always be the 
emphasis on trying to gain more information by allowing the participant to lead the 
conversation wherever possible. Participants were instructed not to take part in the interview 
while under the influence of drugs, similar to the guidelines given during Van Hout and 
Bingham’s (2016) qualitative interviewing of forum users. 
 
The most appropriate sampling method to get face to face contact with reclusive groups 
appeared to be snowball sampling. Atkinson and Flint (2001. pg.1) stated: "Although they 
violate the principles of sampling, the use of snowball strategies provides a means of 
accessing vulnerable and more impenetrable social groupings." To begin sampling, 
enquiries were made with peers who suggested knowledge of cryptomarket users among 
their social groups. If a suitable participant was found, the initial peer was used as a proxy to 
inform the user that I was looking to contact the identified cryptomarket user to be used as 
part of a study and state that all interactions were protected by anonymity. During this 
process, six individuals who used the dark web cryptomarkets came forward. Direct contact 
was then made through the use of encrypted communications with potential participants. 
During this initial contact the aims of the research were explained in detail and the offer to 
participate in an interview was made. Four agreed to take part and two declined the offer, 
citing personal safety as their reasoning for not wanting to take part in the study.   
 
The study involved interviewing participants who were involved in conducting illegal activities 
which are in breach of UK Law, research involving these individuals is done so in order 
present a contemporary picture of illicit behaviours which will then go on to inform 
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contemporary criminology (Ancrum & Treadwell, 2016). Maintaining the anonymity of the 
participants was key to their involvement in the study. As with other studies that involve 
participants who are involved in current criminality, protecting participants’ identities is not 
just an ethical necessity but a core principle of the study (Treadwell, 2011; Ancrum & 
Treadwell, 2016). To ensure the anonymity and protection of the participants, pseudonyms 
were used, and all data was destroyed following completion of the research. 
 
1 Literature Review  
 
The Silk Road and Emerging Illicit Markets  
The Silk Road, the first mainstream cryptomarket, was established in 2011 under the 
administration of a person identified as The Dread Pirate Roberts. Users found the Silk Road 
easy to navigate as the site allowed them to view numerous drug variations under the pages 
categorisation system. Payment was made by using the crypto-secure currency Bitcoin, 
making all purchases untraceable to agencies monitoring transactions (Barratt, 2012). The 
Silk Road allowed users to rate the vendors for the quality of their product and the conduct of 
the vendor, leading to the dominance of several notable vendors on the site (Van Hout & 
Bingham, 2013). The revenue stream of the Silk Road had been estimated to be in the 
region of $22.8 million in 2012, just after the site had begun to streamline its contents, 
moving weaponry to a sister site: “The Armoury” (Christin, 2013). After the capture of The 
Dread Pirate Roberts, identified as Ross William Ulbricht, by the FBI in 2013, it was revealed 
that the Silk Road had earned $1.2 Billion between 2011 and 2013 (Greenberg, 2013).  
 
After the closure of the Silk Road in 2013, a multitude of new cryptomarkets filled the hole in 
the online Dark Web narcotics market (Buskirk et al, 2017). In January 2016 it was estimated 
that the global revenues of cryptomarkets were between $12 and $21 Million per month. It 
should be noted that “offline” drugs purchased from conventional sources in Europe alone 
was estimated to have reached $2.1 Billion per month. The UK is considered to have the 
second largest market within cryptomarkets, accounting for 16% of all online sales, behind 
the USAs 35% (Kruithof et al, 2016). While the sales of drugs online is a small percentage 
compared to that of more traditional drug sales, there is clear evidence that there is a high 
demand for cryptomarkets in the UK. Evidence from academic studies has indicated that the 
average cryptomarket user appears to be: male, white, English speaking, mid-twenties, 
highly educated, full/part time employed or currently studying at higher education institutions 
(Kruithof et al, 2016; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013; Barratt, Ferris & Winstock, 2016). 98.2% of 
transactions on cryptomarkets were for small amounts of drugs, which accounted for 75% of 
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total revenue (Kruithof et al, 2016). An analysis of The Global Drug Survey conducted in 
2014 found that drugs most commonly obtained from cryptomarkets were MDMA, Cannabis 
and LSD (Barratt, Ferris & Winstock, 2016), similar to findings that Cannabis, MDMA and 
powdered cocaine were the most commonly purchased drugs in the UK (Home Office, 
2013). 
 
Quality and The “Drugs Connoisseur”  
Drug quality can have a number of different meanings depending on the user. Quality of an 
illicit substance can refer to: the chemical purity, effective potency, predictable effect, 
security of supply, financial value of purchase and reliability (Bancroft & Reid, 2016). 
Research involving users who purchase illicit substances offline indicate that they are often 
unsure how to gain predictable and consistent drug quality, and are generally reluctant to 
question their drug dealers about the quality of their purchase as dealers are often seen as 
an unreliable source of information (Best et al, 2004). Offline markets typically gauge quality 
through repeated transactions, shared culture and the sharing of information about the 
market through social groups wherever possible (Dwyer & Moore, 2010). Cryptomarket 
users identified quality as one of their major priorities when purchasing of the Darknet 
(Bancroft & Reid, 2016).  Vendors on cryptomarkets state the quality of their product to 
advertise online, listing the different attributes and qualities of their products. Vendor’s claims 
are then evaluated in reviews via a comments section run by users who have purchased 
from the vendor, this is in order to give a guide for other potential buyers (Buxton & 
Bingham, 2015). This desire for quality, and the detailed scientific knowledge of the illicit 
substances amongst cryptomarkets users was identified by Van Hout and Bingham (2013) 
as the “Drugs Connoisseurs”. A study to test the purity of drugs purchased from dark web 
sites and offline street dealers found that illicit substances from cryptomarkets were far more 
likely to contain the advertised product and have a much higher purity then substances 
gained through offline transactions (Caudevilla et al, 2015). Bancroft and Reid (2016) found 
that cryptomarket users had indicated that they expected reliably high quality from their 
online purchases and used the term “Street Quality” to refer to the lowest quality products. 
Users commented:  
“Although it is possible to obtain good quality products in the off-line markets, it is not 
possible to do so reliably or as cheaply” (Bancroft & Reid, 2016, Pg.44).  
 
The level of confidence in the products on cryptomarkets can also be attributed to the 
professional business approaches of cryptomarket vendors, who use; professional 
advertising; communication with customers; competitive pricing; attractive stealth techniques 
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and a presence on Darknet forums as ways of securing a reliable customer base (Van Hout 
& Bingham, 2013).  
 
Harm Reduction  
Drug markets are notoriously violent and turbulent in nature. Within these offline markets 
there is expected to be an element of intimidation and potential violence, as the risk of losing 
profit to: unsecure transactions, theft of product, or violence against them is too high for 
many dealers to risk (Bean, 2008). Cryptomarket users who have used street dealers and 
friends as an alternative source of narcotics have expressed that when using these Darknet 
sites they receive less threats to personal safety, experience fewer acts of physical violence 
from dealers and were reported to the authorities less (Barratt, Ferris & Winstock, 2016).  
While Cryptomarkets are seen to be used as a method of reducing potential harms for their 
users, Darknet markets are not without their own risks. Although customer feedback is 
encouraged, vendors can scam customers by receiving the payment and claiming that the 
shipment had been lost on route to them, or take money for users and then close down their 
page. Alternatively, a vendor with a good reputation can be irrevocably damaged by a 
customer who states they had never received the shipment and threaten to ruin the vendor’s 
reputation (Tzabetakis et al, 2016). Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2016) found that users were 
at risk of; having their personal information revealed: blackmail; theft of money or identity; 
fraud and even cyber bullying. But despite of these unique conflicts, studies have found that 
the communicatory nature of cryptomarkets allows for a unique community ethos to be 
created, and it is this community of users working together to prevent scamming, give 
advice, tell stories gives an insight into the social construction of these markets (Van Hout & 
Bingham, 2013).   
 
Anonymity, Authorities and Accessibility  
Clough (2015) identified a number of factors that have made cyberspace so appealing to the 
21st Century cyber-criminal, namely: global reach, anonymity and the absence of capable 
guardians. The anonymity of the internet, and associated encryption software, gives 
compelling motivation for criminals to engage in cyber-criminality with the assurance that 
they have been protected from interception by law enforcement. Cryptomarket vendors and 
users state that they use the Dark Web to dramatically reduce the risk of being identified and 
caught by the authorities (Aldridge & Askew, 2017). Cryptomarkets provide anonymity to a 
user’s transactions with a platform on software that helps prevent detection by law 
enforcement, but the edition of encrypted communication and a crypto-secure payment 
system allows cryptomarket users to feel safer making transactions compared to that of an 
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offline transaction (Barratt & Aldridge 2016). Clough (2015) argues that the lack of capable 
guardians to detect and prevent criminal activity, mainly failures of law enforcement 
agencies, is a major influence on the behaviour of offenders who use the internet to commit 
crime. The global reach that the internet provides has added a transnational element to 
criminal enterprises which has created a new paradigm for international criminality. Some 
cryptomarket vendors take the risk of shipping their drugs internationally, but research 
shows that vendors who were living in countries with wealthier populations, were not willing 
to take the risk due to the perceived effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies at 
intercepting their packages in transit when they had a reliable and stable market within their 
own nation (Décary-Hétu et al., 2016). Vendors on cryptomarkets tend to be a mix of 
professional drug dealers mainly dealing offline, who have close ties to their distribution 
chains but see cryptomarkets as a source extra revenue and a potential means to purchase 
higher quality drugs for their offline distribution; and so called “newbies”, cryptomarket users 
who may have only ever been selling to their friends and have begun to branch out their new 
business as an alternative source of revenue (Barratt, Ferris & Winstock, 2016). It is this 
combination of a new virtual markets and methods of sourcing “quality” drugs that can be 
sold both online, offline, or shared among their friendship groups that makes Cryptomarkets 
enticing to vendors (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016).  
 
2 Findings and Discussion  
Cryptomarket Mentoring  
The first line of questioning was aimed at understanding how participants first became active 
users of cryptomarkets and the influences that drove them from offline dealers to online 
markets. Van Hout and Bingham (2013) found that users first gained access to Dark Web 
markets through their own research on websites and other forms of media, such as 
television. Only one participant had learned solely via this method and stated that he was 
part of a group who had discovered cryptomarkets by viewing legitimate media such as 
VICE News, Reddit and general Google searches. Three of the participants stated that they 
had first gained knowledge of the benefits of Dark Web drugs markets from a close friend, or 
mentor, who was a cryptomarket user. The mentor and participant would begin by 
discussing perceived differences between offline and online drug purchasing: 
“One of my friends uses it, and he was explaining to me how he gets his stuff. Which 
is a much higher quality for a better value for money, and that’s how the idea first 
came into being really” – Tom  
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Discussion of Dark Web markets then led participants to question their drug purchasing 
habits. Four common themes were identified as the initial drivers of the participants moving 
to cryptomarkets: price difference between offline and online purchases; the increased 
quality of substances; greater protection from the authorities; and a perceived failure, or 
distrust, of offline dealers. The mentors would then give the participants advice and guidance 
on how to use the markets:  
“The guy I was working with, he was actually Polish about 17 and he was talking to 
me about it. And at the time it was about £45 a gram [MDMA] and he was buying it in 
for 20 quid. Me and my friends were about to go to a gig, and erm, that was really the 
catalyst for “Right let’s get some cheap MDMA”. And he showed me how to do it, he 
set me up the VPNs, the TOR browsers, the onion browsers, the website names” – 
John 
 
While Charlie was the only participant to have learned of the existence of cryptomarkets 
through media exposure, he was still instructed in its use a more technologically skilled 
member of his peer group. A Cryptomarket Mentoring process appears to have a sizable 
effect on the uptake of cryptomarket use.  
 
Online Quality 
Participants repeatedly made comments about the quality of the drugs that they were 
purchasing. Whenever the subject of quality was being discussed during the interview, I 
asked the participant to explain what drug quality meant to them. Participants gave answers 
similar to that of the research by Bancroft and Reid (2016), that “quality” of a drug was 
centred around purity, potency and predictable effect. Participants were quick to point out 
that their notion of quality was more nuanced, and the notion of quality varied for personal 
preferences:  
“I simply look in terms of purity. Purity is my quality. If I’m buying MDMA I know I 
want it 93% pure because that’s my mark for high quality. That is pretty much top 
quality. Cocaine I don’t mind as long as it doesn’t get below 80% or 75% ‘cause 
someone could have cut it with speed and not everybody loves speed for some 
reason” – John  
“It really depends on what drug. So, for cannabis what’s good for cannabis? It’s high 
THC content, that’s good cannabis, you can usually tell by looking at it…. MDMA 
again is based on how much MDMA is in it, so a good purity is probably 80 plus 
percent and bad is under 60 because you don’t know what the other 40 percent is cut 
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with. If you buy it online, it is usually cut with… I don’t know. I’m not sure but 85% is 
good, so 15% of whatever else” – Romeo  
 
This attitude depicts the themes of the Drugs Connoisseur (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013), the 
user’s attitudes towards seeking higher perceived quality that conforms to the personal 
standards of the consumer. Users who are identified as drugs connoisseurs display detailed 
chemical and practical knowledge of substances that they are purchasing. While none of the 
participants were directly asked if they had felt connoisseurial, their responses indicated that 
they followed the same lines of thinking as that of the Silk Road users. 
 
Tom and John both stated that they use cryptomarkets as a reliable source of illicit 
substances that were safer than the street alternatives. Both participants stated that they 
had purchased drug testing kits from the Dark Web to test purity of products they purchased 
online. John admitted that in the previous year he had been a small-scale drug dealer who 
was purchasing off the dark web to aid his offline distribution chain. He stated: 
“When the MDMA is in crystal or rock form I’m generally alright but one turned up 
Black, which I have never had before, but if it is very thin then you know it could be 
cut with anything, so I will get out a kit and test it. It’s a safety precaution, a fiver for a 
3-pack tester kit and you get to test 3 samples… A lot of the vendors and pages will 
say what purity the drug is at face value and if you get the tester kits then you can 
check that quality” - John   
 
Using testing kits to accurately check the quality of the product he was going to be selling 
shows the business acumen and entrepreneurial action that Barratt and Aldridge (2016) had 
stated was a trait of cryptomarket users. However, he was using testing kits as a safety 
precaution rather than a tool of business. A similar drive to test the contents of the drugs he 
would be using was identified by Tom. Whilst we were discussing drug quality, Tom 
produced three bottle of drug testing reagents and explained: 
“I’m more focused on not putting bad stuff in my body that I’m not wanting to, so it’s 
more for personal safety. I’m quite health conscious about it… These are the 
reagents, it’s kind of a cross referencing system. I have this chart to compare the 
reaction too. So, you just add it then you can cross reference the chart and see what 
they have put into it. Especially the stuff that could really hurt you” - Tom 
 
The use of testing kits to confirm purity of drugs purchased on cryptomarkets is a method of 
harm reduction. Wanting to purchase from cryptomarkets for purity is one driving factor, but 
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the intent of preventing personal harm is clearly an influencing factor for their use of the Dark 
Web markets. Participants valuing the reliability of substances, in reference to safety, is an 
example of harm reduction also seen by Van Hout and Bingham (2013) in their analysis of 
Silk Road users. Harm reduction tactics of purchasing substances of a higher purity was also 
seen in participants who did not indicate that they used testing kits but both cited that the 
overall increased purity and lack of contaminations in the drugs they purchased as a major 
influencer.  
 
The Price of Quality  
The total amount of money spent on cryptomarkets by participants varied. The lowest 
spending user, Romeo, spent £200 - £300 in his 8 months using cryptomarkets. The highest 
spending participant was John, who stated that he had spent £1700 - £2500 during his 
cryptomarket use. Participants suggested that whilst individual drugs offline may be cheaper 
than those found online, drug quality and purity had not been factored into the price 
difference gram for gram:  
“You looked shocked when I was talking about 25 ecstasy tablets not being 
expensive but offline that would probably cost a couple of hundred pounds whereas I 
spend £60. Especially when you to factor in the purity and the quality of it. So, I know 
someone in [Redacted] who sells a gram of ecstasy for £40 and that gram on MD will 
be about 30% p ure, so really it is around £120 for a gram which you could buy 
for about £10 online” – Tom  
“On the streets I would say it is slightly more damp [Cannabis]. It’s been rushed 
through production. Whereas on the Darknet it has been perfectly cured, it’s 
completely dry and it has less imperfections. You’re paying for the actual weight of 
the weed and not the added water weight” – Charlie   
 
Participants were always quick to condemn both quality and pricing of the drugs sold by 
offline dealers. They displayed distrust towards the contents and market value of the drugs 
sold by the street dealers, and stated that price was a heavy influencer in their decision 
making; this behaviour was evident in other studies (Barratt, Ferris & Winstock, 2016; Van 
Hout & Bingham 2013). The demand for higher quality goods at affordable, or at least 
competitive, prices in comparison to “Street Quality” alternatives also demonstrated the 
mirroring of consumer values found in cryptomarket users by Bancroft and Reid (2016) who 
described cryptomarket users as having a rational consumer orientation. 
 
Drug Availability and Niche Markets  
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Participants referenced the high number drug variations found on cryptomarkets as a factor 
that influences their purchases. Whether it be differing strains of cannabis, or different 
brands of MDMA, participants often boasted about the immense range and variation 
available to them. An example of this behaviour was stated by Charlie:  
“I, like, even go to the gym stoned. I will smoke a spliff and then go to the gym and 
only certain strains I can do that with, like some strains I can have with a cup of 
coffee so stuff like that. I do go looking for some strains that I like you know and 
Dream Market has so many different strains it is insane” - Charlie 
The sheer volume of drug types and variations online is a clear draw for Dark Web users 
(Barratt & Aldridge, 2016), but also provides a location for rare or difficult to access 
substances. When asked about the variation in the quality between street psychedelics and 
those purchased online, Tom stated: 
“I suppose psychedelics is a whole other discussion as because street dealers rarely 
ever sell them. I’ve spoken to dealers who don’t even know what 2CB is, I’ve never 
really, I think I’ve come across one person in my life who sold Acid on the street. So 
that is another thing, availability, you go online, and you can find literally anything you 
want. Otherwise there is no real access to psychedelics on the street” - Tom 
 
Tom had also stated that he had sourced a number of uncommon drugs from his dark web 
use, notably: Ketamine, GBL, 2CB and Mescaline. Cryptomarkets may therefore fill a niche 
hole in the wider drug market for gaining access to high quality and rarely seen psychedelics 
that users would otherwise not have access to from street dealers.  
 
Group Purchasing and Social Supply     
The drugs that were most commonly purchased by the four participants were: Cannabis, 
MDMA, LSD and Cocaine, similar to Barratt and Aldridge (2016) who found that party drugs 
are the main purchases on Dark Web markets. The majority of participants stated that their 
current purchasing habits were sporadic, and that purchasing drugs off of the dark web were 
generally planned ahead of time. This planning period before a cryptomarket purchase gave 
users the view of their cryptomarket purchases as a personal treat or for special occasions, 
such as birthdays and festivals: 
“I just bought online with my friends. Well it’s more like a gathering. “What do you 
want for the festival? What do you want?” Etcetera and everybody will say exactly 
what they want. One big order on the dark web and 5 days later it comes through 
your post box and you say, “that’s for you” blah blah blah, Simple as that. Mate it’s 
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like a group activity. We all sit round a computer, it’s like “Which drugs do we want” – 
Romeo   
 
Participants have given insight into some of the purchasing habits of cryptomarket users. 
Users announce that they are about to make a purchase off the Darknet to their drug using 
social groups, and the group coordinates a list of drugs and arranging monetary 
transactions. This practice of social supply is typical of a closed drug market (Barratt, Ferris 
& Winstock, 2016) must therefore also be a factor that is considered by Dark Web users. 
Participants also indicated that this type of group transaction commonly occurs in 
preparation for an event, where an acceptable amount of time left between that of the order 
and expected delivery:  
“Oh, I plan well in advance. Say this Friday, there isn’t going to be enough time to 
order so I will just say fuck it and drink some alcohol, err, but if in like three weeks 
there is band or a really good DJ that’s playing here I would be like “Yeah maybe, I 
may go all out on this night out” you know? “I may go get myself some drugs for this 
one”. If, you know, it is very impromptu night and you didn’t know you were going out 
until two hours before it would be impossible to use the dark web. It’s not a “That very 
day” sort of deal, you would have to go to street dealer which isn’t all that bad but it’s 
not preferable” – Romeo  
 
This delayed drug deal was described by Aldridge and Askew (2017) as a deal stretched 
across time meaning that the user understands that there will be a reasonable delay 
between order and delivery of the drugs purchased. The deal being stretched across time is 
an influencing factor for the users when they are considering making a purchase. If the user 
does not have time, or becomes impatient, then they move offline for their particular need. 
Implying that Dark Web drug deals are more considered and organised rather than 
spontaneous forms of online shopping.  
 
Stealth Deliveries  
Another notable topic of conversation during the interviews was about the methods by which 
drugs arrived. Participants stated that illicit substances generally arrived in inconspicuous 
envelopes, vacuum sealed and covered in metallic foil to prevent detection from x-rays. 
Participants became energetic and enthused when talking about unusual methods that 
online vendors used to deliver drugs:   
“I’ve had some funny ones. Got some Acid that claimed to be from a London based 
Buddhist group, which was funny. One of my friends, who was the guy who 
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introduced me to the Darknet, got me some mescaline but when it arrived it was 
placed inside the Communist manifesto. It can vary and that’s one of the funniest bits 
about it really. The surprise of how it arrives” – Tom  
 
“Good stealth means the dealer send out packages that don’t tend to get caught, 
things like that. I’ve had stuff delivered in DVDs, CDs, in packs of cards. I had one 
come in like a little Lightbulb, unscrewed the little base and the MDMA was in the 
bottom of it. Unbelievable stealth” - John 
 
The hidden nature of how the packages arrive is key to the decision making of participants, 
as it is seen as the most vulnerable stage of the purchasing process, all participants claimed 
to only purchase drugs on the dark web markets in small quantities so as to lower the risk of 
detection from authorities. They stated that vendors who advertise for their stealth tactics are 
prioritised as a reliable vendor (Van Hout & Bingham, 2015; 2016). Participants felt they 
were partaking in intelligent and safer forms of drugs transaction. John made a notable 
comment about the value of stealth and delivery methods to cryptomarket users: 
“Sometimes it is ridiculous. I’ve literally been sitting in the living room with my friends 
watching the door and saying, “I’m waiting for my drugs to be delivered by me dealer 
in a second” and they’re like who? And this postman comes straight through the door 
and give me an envelope it’s ridiculous. I said to my mate “My dealer is the 
Postman”, Yeah my dealer is Postman Pat” - John  
 
Community or Consumerism?  
As many other qualitative studies have shown that the review system is a core factor that 
influences users (Bancroft & Reid, 2015, Van Hout & Bingham, 2013, Barratt & Aldridge, 
2016). All participants cited that reviews left by previous users on a vendor’s page were an 
essential instrument that allowed them to assess the quality of the vendor and prevent 
purchasing from scammers:   
“So, say a vendor has a thousand feedback entries, you can click on them and they 
may say “Good guy, will get it to you in a couple of days. Great weed, blah blah 
blah”. And then based on that I will make my decision on whether to buy it or not. So, 
it’s as simple as that really. If people were scamming or botting it, then they would 
not get good feedback from it. It’s quite a sophisticated system” – Romeo  
 
Participants stated that the use of reviews is an integral and essential component of a 
functioning cryptomarket, and that the review system heavily influenced purchasing habits. 
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Van Hout and Bingham (2013) found that markets had a community ethos and that users 
had a sense of belonging to an online community, who felt part of a large group of drug 
users who shared advice, stories, experiences, prevented fraudulent activities such as exit 
scams and other general interests. This sense of community was identified by Tom and 
John, who stated they were active forum members and felt heavily attached to the 
communities of their individual markets and that cryptomarkets would not function without 
the larger community: 
“It’s definitely very community orientated. A customer base implies a sort of 
impersonality, like on Amazon. It translates into a community feel because people 
are looking out for each other and saying, “I got scammed and even though you are a 
stranger I don’t want you to get scammed as well”. So, it is a very friendly 
atmosphere you could say” - Tom 
 
Van Hout and Bingham (2013) identified a community ethos by collecting data from forums 
and conducting interviews with forum users who were active on forums. Charlie and Romeo, 
stated that they were not active forum members and did not identify as being part of a 
community. Instead they stated that transactions on cryptomarkets were more akin to an 
impersonal transaction on other market websites, such as Amazon: 
“I’d say it was more like Amazon. At the end of the day everyone is there to make 
money. It’s not a community. I’m not linked to any of it. My community are the guys I 
chill and smoke with, not some stranger online” – Charlie  
“Would you describe eBay as a community? I don’t think it is compact enough for it to 
be a community, it’s more just like Amazon. It’s more of an Amazon review section 
than Reddit. eBay is easily the closet thing I can compare it too” – Romeo 
 
The impersonal experience of cryptomarkets can be compared to the consumer 
impersonality that is seen by Goldman’s (1982) research into local grocery stores being 
replaced by large corporate shopping chains. The drugs market transitioning online is 
comparable to that of the modernisation and transformation of traditional systems of small 
one‐line food stores, which were considered costly and had inefficient distribution of 
food items (Goldman, 1982), into the formation of one-stop and shop superstores. This 
modernisation can be seen in the willingness of cryptomarkets to copy the designs and 
typography of successful legitimate consumer web-markets. As previously referenced, 
participants found cryptomarkets appealing as they were easy to navigate, similar to my 
own exploration of the AlphaBay cryptomarket. Some users describe competition 
between sites:  
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“Hansa is the best one. The pay system is much better than other sites and there are 
fewer scammers and it is a much better interface. Like, you can tell AlphaBay has 
been made by Russians, whereas if you go on Hansa it actually looks and feels like a 
legitimate website. Not really legitimate but a nicer user interface if you understand?” 
- Tom 
 
Perhaps there is a larger group of cryptomarket users with a one-stop and shop approach. 
These non-vocal, non-forum users could not have been included in the model of the markets 
social construction (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013). While there definitely are feelings of 
community amongst users, the size and scope of this potentially silent majority needs to be 
examined further to better understand the potential popularity of cryptomarkets and their 
driving influencing factors.     
 
Questions of Anonymity and Confidence   
The anonymity provided by cryptomarkets and associated software has been cited as an 
influencing factor for cryptomarket users (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Broséus et al, 2016; 
Barratt & Aldridge 2017). All participants stated that they felt more secure against detection 
by law enforcement when using cryptomarkets and the Tor browser, which is comparable to 
the findings of similar studies. Charlie and Romeo both used pseudonyms and sent the 
drugs to their university address or a house belonging to a confederate. On the contrary, 
when asked about how they had drugs sent to them, Tom and John stated that they used 
their real names and current addresses when asked for delivery information: 
“I use my real name and address. It doesn’t make sense to me to use a pseudonym 
to be honest. I know there would be no evidence on me to prove anything because 
Thales and encryption and so on. It really reassures me that all this is helping me not 
getting caught by the authorities” – Tom  
“I would never use a fake name either because that would just look more suspicious 
than my name because if they catch something at the post office. I’ve read on forums 
that it is better to give your actual name as if the post office ever catch something 
then you will get in a lot of trouble because that name will not come up as registered 
to that house and you can get done for using a fake name or something. I mean it is 
the Royal Mail, come on, they are not the right company to look for it. They wouldn’t 
know where to start” – John  
 
Tom and John stated they had little fear of being caught by the authorities as they perceived 
agencies associated with potentially detecting their packages as being unserviceable. The 
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realisation that cryptomarket users give out their real details strikes in the face of using a 
system that is touted for its anonymity. Both participants reasoned that giving out their 
personal information was to allow for a smooth transaction between themselves and the 
vendor. Perhaps this was a sign of trust between vendor and consumer, or as the 
participants saw it, a simplified method by which to receive drugs promptly and efficiently. 
Neither participant had had a package intercepted by the authorities, they stated that it was 
the use of reviews and the procurement of reliable vendors who used good stealth 
techniques to achieve this. Décary-Hétu, Paquet-Clouston, and Aldridge (2016) concluded 
that vendors were less willing to ship internationally for fear of interception by effective drug 
prevention agencies, and prefer to sell within their own nation where the authorities are seen 
as ineffective. This lack of intervention is an example of what Clough (2015) called absence 
of capable guardians, and speaks volumes about how cryptomarket vendors and users view 
the authorities in the UK. Whilst anonymity is indeed a factor that heavily influences use of 
cryptomarkets; users giving out and receiving drugs packages under their real names is an 
interesting manifestation of the confidence that cryptomarket users have in the process that 
they use, and an insight into their perceived capability of UK law enforcement.  
 
Conclusion 
This research aimed to identify core factors that influence use of cryptomarkets from 
perspectives of users themselves and to identify previously uncovered themes. The major 
themes from the literature have been affirmed. Quality is a core, if not the core, influencer of 
cryptomarket use. Purity, potency and reliable effect (Bancroft & Reid, 2016) are prioritised 
by users, including the self-preservationist inclinations of users (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013). 
The rational consumer (Bancroft & Reid, 2015) values of: availability, comparative pricing 
and quality are all traits that can be afforded to cryptomarkets users. The ease of access to 
cryptomarkets is astounding. None of the participants described themselves as being a Tech 
savvy computer user; commonly giving answers such as:  
“No, I’m a bit useless with computers I’m not gonna lie. Like, I’m into the software, 
like the mechanics and some of its engineering, but mainly I’m good with the internet. 
I don’t know if I could be called tech savvy mate. It’s just not really my thing” – 
Charlie  
 
Testimonials from the participants highlights the simplicity of cryptomarkets as a key factor 
influencing their use. Easily digestible media, and the Cryptomarket mentoring process 
experienced by participants, provides an ease of use which makes cryptomarkets very 
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attractive and accessible to potential users, even to those who have little technical 
knowledge or skill.   
 
The markets themselves aid their own accessibility through the mirroring of legitimate online 
markets. The modernisation and mirroring of surface websites, or Crypto-legitimisation, has 
the effect of distorting the user’s conceptualisation of the Dark Web criminal markets as 
criminal. Participants described their experiences of using cryptomarkets as becoming 
mundane or routine. Some stated their own perception of the illegality of the sites soon 
became distorted: 
“They look exactly like normal legitimate sites. You forget it’s illegal when you are on 
it” –Tom   
This distortion, or the legitimising effects of cryptomarkets appears to centralise around the 
ease of accessibility to the sites and the simplicity and speed by which a user can make 
transactions. 
 
The confidence displayed by participants whenever discussing the possibility of being 
intercepted by authorities speaks volumes to their perceived security when using 
cryptomarkets. Review systems, professional stealth tactics of vendors and untraceable 
conversations and interactions with other users were all described as core influencers for 
participant’s cryptomarket use. Whilst none of the participants stated that they were 
completely immune to detection, the perceived lack of capable guardians (Clough, 2015) has 
given the users of cryptomarkets an unshakable confidence in the systems and processes 
that they employ in their cryptomarket use. Another factor that appears to influence users is 
the social nature of cryptomarket use. At the beginning of the study, my mental image of the 
cryptomarket user was that of a solitary, isolated and introverted character. However, the 
participants of this study explained that their use of cryptomarket had social implications. 
While not all of the participants had seen the markets themselves as a community, or 
identified with that community, all of the participants stated some social reasoning for their 
use: creating orders in groups, distribution high quality drugs among friends and ordering as 
a treat for an event or special occasion. However, this result may be due to the sampling 
process that was used. Attaining participants for the study relied on members of their peer 
groups identifying the participants as cryptomarket users, which implies some social 
diffusion of the knowledge of their cryptomarket use, which may not be representative of all 
cryptomarket users.  
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A recommendation found from my experience with the participants, is that where possible, 
cryptomarket research should be informed with a greater number of face to face qualitative 
interviews. However, there are many well founded limiting factors to that regard. This study 
was also not without limitation. The restriction of a gendered bias and that pool of 
participants were limited to white British males from universities in the UK makes the results 
very difficult to generalise. Nevertheless, I found the four participants of the study extremely 
informative, giving very detailed descriptions of their cryptomarket use, accommodating in 
their availability and always ready to correct errors in my line of questioning.  
Barratt and Aldridge (2016) asked the question: Do cryptomarkets represent the biggest 
challenge to the prohibition of drugs in the United Kingdom?  Participants of this study stated 
that they believed they had the right to use substances that they believed were less harmful 
than other legal substances, such as alcohol, and expressed frustration at their implied 
criminality as a result of drug policy. Some even expressing disappointment with punitive 
drug policies at their Universities. While factors like quality and anonymity are influencers of 
the use of cryptomarkets, all of the participants stated that they would happily pay more for a 
legitimised version of the substances that they purchased on cryptomarkets.   
“At the end of the day, I don’t see why the time spent by police officers for someone 
who’s got or selling a 10 bag of weed can do any real good for society. Like 
compared to alcohol which is legal, I find that is way more damaging overall. It’s a 
mess. I would happily pay more if weed was legal, you know?” – Charlie   
 
As for the future of cryptomarkets, participants believed that the markets would continue to 
expand as the distribution of their knowledge permeates society.  
“I think they will keep growing because as the markets are getting older. Their user 
base keeps expanding as the population of the markets gets older. You know the 
younger generations a more tech savvy, people who are 15 years old know how to 
get onto these sites. As the community grows greater in number, it grows greater in 
cohesiveness. The markets I use have never run so smoothly and will continue to do 
so” - Tom  
 
As knowledge of these markets is spread, and the influencing factors are explained to 
potential users through either media/internet sources, or mentoring from a more experienced 
user, it is my opinion that the use of cryptomarkets will continue to expand. This expansion 
will be seen in both the population size of the markets, and in the revenue earned. 
Cryptomarkets represent a major challenge of drug policy in the UK, and their continued 
research is foremost into gaining greater insight of the depths of their influence.  
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